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Abstract 
Two enormously influential perspectives on courts offer fundamentally different 
predictions about court outcomes and the effects of judge ideology on those outcomes. Well-
known to political scientists studying courts, the ideological voting (IV) literature argues that 
judge ideology is a strong predictor of court outcomes and that those outcomes should be 
proximate to the policy preferences of courts. Less known to political scientists but highly 
influential, the law and economics perspective (LE) focuses on settlement behavior of litigants 
who try to minimize costs and thus estimate likely outcomes in court, and settle simpler cases 
pre-trial.  In this case selection process litigants respond to cues that signal likely outcomes with 
the result that only complex, less predictable cases make it to trial leading to win-rates that 
coalesce at fifty percent for plaintiffs or defendants.  From this perspective, litigant strategies 
cancel out the effects of judge ideology and court outcomes do not correspond to judges’ 
ideological preferences. We reconcile these perspectives by examining tort cases in state supreme 
courts from 1995 through 1998.  The contrasting perspectives stem from the fundamental 
institutional processes upon which each perspective is based. The LE perspective dominates in 
states without lower appellate courts (LAC) where process of appeal in these state supreme courts 
is litigant-driven, with win-rates hovering at fifty percent and deviations from that norm 
accounted for by forces influencing litigant uncertainty.  The ideological voting predicted by the 
IV literature occurs primarily in the context of state supreme court strategic reversals of LAC 
decisions---a process commensurate that operating with the U.S. Supreme Court. When it comes 
to judicial outcomes, institutional structure is a critical element shaping the influence of litigant 
strategy and judge ideology. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
There is a well-established literature familiar to most political scientists who study courts 
(henceforth labeled IV) that argues that judges, with preferences over policy outcomes, vote 
ideologically when rendering judicial opinions (see e.g. Segal and Cover 1989; Segal 1997; Segal 
and Spaeth 1993; Segal, Epstein, Cameron and Spaeth 1995; Gely and Spiller 1990; de Figuerido 
and Tiller 1996; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989, 1995; Cross and Tiller 1998).  This 
literature has been vastly influential in political science approaches to studying law and courts. 
There is another perspective perhaps less familiar to political scientists but nonetheless 
important. The field of law and economics has provided a powerful account of how judicial 
processes operate (henceforth labeled LE) (see e.g., Posner 1973; Eisenberg and Farber 1977; 
Priest and Klein 1984; Witmann 1985; Kessler, Meites and Miller 1996). In their well known 
“selection hypothesis” regarding disputes and litigation, Priest and Klein (1984) note that taking 
cases to court has costs and this perspective deduces that litigant settlement behavior will seek to 
avoid those costs where possible.  Litigants make estimates of who is likely to win and lose and 
simpler cases commonly settle in pre-trial. The cases that go to trial according to this perspective 
are difficult, complex and less predictable.  As there are no obvious winners or losers in these 
cases, it is predicted that plaintiff/defendant win-rates will hover at fifty percent.1   
The “fifty percent rule” has become a very prominent idea in the LE perspective, 
discussed in major legal texts (Posner 1998; Polinsky 1989; Cooter and Ulen 1988) and 
showcased as a fundamental feature of the LE field (Donahue 1988). While influential, there has 
been a theoretical debate about strategy and/or rationality — that is, how the plaintiff/defendant 
might predict the probability of winning . Kessler, et al. (1996) provide a survey of empirical 
studies on the Priest-Klein hypothesis which notes that the fifty percent rule in its simplest form 
had not been supported empirically in most of the empirical studies and suggest modifications to 
                                                 
1 In their seminal study, Priest and Klein (1984) found that plaintiffs consistently won 50% of the 
time in sampled cases in the Cook County (Illinois) and Hamilton County (Ohio) courts. 
 
2 the rule.  These modifications commonly focus on forces shaping the ability of litigants to deal 
with uncertainty including the legal environment and litigant resources, as well as variations in 
stakes at risk for litigants.  Litigants with more resources, or more at stake, may be less eager to 
settle pre-trial but ultimately may suffer losses greater than fifty percent.   
One thing that does not seem to be in dispute in LE is that the case selection process 
resulting from strategic litigants should cancel out the effects of judge ideology when it is known.   
This presents a striking anomaly with the equally influential IV perspective that stresses the 
importance of judge ideology on judicial outcomes. Within LE a sizable body of literature 
derived from formal models argues that judges may be motivated ideologically but as long as that 
ideology is known, litigants will make strategic decisions about whether to pursue their case with 
that ideology in mind (Priest and Klein 1984; Wittman 1985, 1988; Waldfogel 1995).  Because of 
litigant strategies, courts hear non-random samples of cases.  Litigants seeking liberal 
(conservative) outcomes don’t pursue their cases in conservative (liberal) courts.  If a litigant 
needs a liberal outcome but faces a conservative court they have more incentive to settle pre-trial 
or to drop the case.  The opposite would also hold.  The cases that go to court either have no 
obvious ideological direction or were there based on miscalculations by one of the litigants.  Such 
miscalculation could go in either direction in the long run.  In the end, according to this 
perspective, the effects of judge ideology should be nullified by litigant strategy.  
If judges are voting ideologically to produce outcomes that are proximate to their own 
policy preferences, as suggested by the IV literature, it would stand to reason that 
defendant/plaintiff win-rates should not coalesce around fifty percent if courts are markedly 
liberal or conservative.  In tort cases we would expect to see more outcomes favoring plaintiffs 
where courts are more liberal, and more outcomes favoring defendants where courts are more 
conservative (Sheehan, Mishler and Songer 1992).   
 There is another notable difference between the IV and LE approaches.  
Overwhelmingly, the IV literature has been focused on the United States Supreme Court although 
3 there have been studies of federal appeals and state supreme courts as well (Brace and Hall 
1995; Giles, Hettinger and Peppers 2001; Langer 2002; Brace and Boyea 2004).  Alternatively, 
the LE literature on case selection has focused primarily on trial courts (see e.g. Waldfogel 1998) 
although there are some exceptions (Hanssen 1999; Clermont 2000).  While it could be that 
ideological voting operates in the highest court in the land, but is canceled out by strategic litigant 
case selection in trial or lower appellate courts, this is by no means an obvious conclusion.  
Indeed, if there is anywhere in the American judiciary where the ideology of judges is well-
known, it is in the United States Supreme Court.  While judges in state trial courts or state 
supreme courts are not as prominent as justices on the United States Supreme Court, lawyers 
commonly make it their business to gauge the preferences of judges they argue cases before and 
their long-run professional and financial success commonly hinge on these estimates.   
 We argue below that these seemingly opposed perspectives can be productively 
reconciled by considering institutional design and forces driving cases reaching appeal.  To 
consider this we examine all tort cases decided by state supreme courts in the years 1995 though 
1998.2  We distinguish between states with and without lower appellate courts (LAC).  State 
supreme courts without LACs have non-discretionary dockets and we reason the appeal process is 
litigant driven in these courts.  The cases that go to appeal are the result of litigant calculations 
influenced by the degree of uncertainty litigants bear.  As certainty goes up, we reason that 
deviations from the fifty percent rule will go down.  Moreover, we would predict that judge 
ideology would not influence outcomes in these courts because litigants adjust their strategies to 
incorporate judge ideology.  While these are appeals, in states without LACs, they resemble 
decisions to go to trial because they are exclusively litigant driven. 
  Other states have LACs and their supreme courts have discretion to let lower court 
                                                 
2 These data are found within the State Supreme Court Data Archive (SSCDA), which includes a 
near universal sample of state supreme court cases from 1995 to 1998.  State dockets exceeding 
200 cases in a single year are selected from a random sample of 200 cases.  In most instances, 
case quantities, including tort case quantities, are unaffected due to the limited size of many state 
supreme court dockets. 
4 decisions stand or to hear a case.  While litigant strategies will still play a large role in selecting 
cases for further appeal, judge strategy ultimately determines which cases get on the docket.  
Unlike their counterparts in non-LAC states, jurists in these supreme courts operate in an 
environment more like the United States Supreme Court.  They get to choose from all non-settled 
cases the ones they wish to decide, allowing them an opportunity to exercise their ideological 
preferences through agenda control. 
 We thus might expect to find judge ideological preferences operating in courts with 
discretionary dockets but not necessarily in all outcomes.  Recent research has offered a new 
perspective on the effects of ideology in the United States Supreme Court that is relevant here.  
McGuire, Smith and Caldeira (2004) reason that parties seeking review from the US Supreme 
Court are rational actors who have lost in a lower court and petition the high court only when they 
estimate they will win on the merits.  When litigants estimate that their preferred outcome is 
closer to the preferences of the justices than to the outcome they received in the lower court, they 
will pursue an appeal to the high court.  Alternatively, litigants typically do not pursue their case 
to the high court if they perceive the lower court’s decision will be affirmed:  it would be a waste 
of time and money.   
 Ultimately, not all litigants pursuing appeals to the US Supreme Court make accurate 
calculations.  Inaccurate calculations result in affirmances of lower court decisions and McGuire, 
Smith and Caldeira argue that these cases are not likely to provide evidence of ideological voting.    
Alternatively, when petitioners make accurate calculations about the ideological preferences of 
the court, lower court decisions are reversed.  What is particularly notable about this important 
insight for current purposes is that the accurate estimates (reversals) should reflect the prevailing 
ideology of the court, while inaccurate estimates (affirmances) will not.  When it comes to the 
American states, the appellate structure in states with LACs resembles the process operating 
below the United State Supreme Court.  These state supreme courts have the discretion to make 
strategic reversals and we would thus hypothesize that judge ideology should exert an influence 
5 in reversals of lower court cases.   
 We select tort litigation in state supreme courts for analysis.  This choice is justified on 
several grounds.  First, it is the area of law commonly examined in analyses of case selection 
processes and win-rates and provides the best evidence for the hypothesized processes  
(Eisenberg 1990).  Second, tort cases are commonly examined because they lend themselves to 
the types of strategic calculations presumed to affect the distribution of cases that come to courts.  
Litigants face potential costs and benefits from litigation and from pre-trial settlement and must 
weigh their choices strategically.  Such calculations are decidedly different from those in criminal 
proceedings or in cases involving civil rights or liberties where the stakes and cost calculations 
are significantly different.  Convicted criminals will often exhaust all appeals.  Social groups 
commonly persist in courts against short odds to achieve desired civil reforms in the long-run.  
Third, tort cases commonly have an ideological direction.  Plaintiffs, typically individuals or 
groups representing individuals, seek compensation for damages caused by a business, 
professional, or government.  A decision in favor of a plaintiff is commonly viewed as a liberal 
outcome while one favoring defendants is construed as a conservative outcome (e.g. Sheehan, 
Mishler, and Songer 1992; Yates, Tankesley, and Brace 2005). There are clear liberal and 
conservative sides to most tort cases and it is an area of law where it is reasonable to expect 
judges’ ideology to exert an influence.  When it comes to torts, litigants face conventional 
strategic imperatives in cases with ideological dimensions.  These are ideal conditions for 
considering how strategic case selection processes and judge ideology may interactively operate 
in American state supreme courts. 
In the analysis below we posit two fundamentally different processes to be operating in 
American state supreme courts in tort litigation that have significant influences on win-rates and 
on the effects of judge ideology in influencing judicial outcomes.  Before considering these 
specific hypotheses it will be useful to explore the nature of win-rates in tort cases in state 
supreme courts to gauge how well the fifty percent hypothesis performs regarding these outcomes 
6 and, conversely, any prima facie evidence of clear ideological bias. 
  
Analyzing Plaintiff Win-Rates in State Supreme Courts 
 
 We divide our consideration of win-rates among states that have and do not have LACs 
for the reasons noted above.  Table 1 presents plaintiff win-rates in twelve areas of tort litigation 
appealed before state supreme courts.   Our first concern is whether there is widespread evidence 
of departures from the fifty percent expectation.  The statistical test here is a Bernoulli trial.  
Those trials are modeled by a random variable which can take only two values, 0 and 1, with 1 
being thought of as "success". If P is the probability of success, then the expected value of such a 
random variable is p.  p is estimated with  the number of observer successes out of the total 
number of trials with variance p (1-p).   Just as in the conventional test for a fair coin, evidence of 
bias requires a combination of departures from the fifty percent norm and a sufficient number of 
trials.  In the current example, there may be no significant evidence of departure from the fifty 
percent rule even if the observed win-rates appear to favor one side or the other if there are 
insufficient observations to render a strong probabilistic conclusion.  Alternatively, there may be 
seemingly modest bias in some states but substantially more cases and such modest bias may 
nonetheless be statistically significant. 
 Examining Table 1 the most notable feature of these win-rates is that only one category 
of tort (i.e. discrimination) is statistically different from fifty percent, and that is only in states 
with LACs.  This pattern would seem to provide compelling evidence for the fifty percent 
hypothesis.  If we assume there is an ideological direction to tort cases, there is little evidence of 
ideological bias in outcomes when grouped by area of law. 
[Table 1 here] 
 The effects of ideological bias could be masked when grouping cases by areas of law.  
Ideological bias could be more likely at the court level.  Table 2 illustrates it is modest at best.   
The thirty-six states presented in this table had plaintiff win-rates that were not statistically 
7 different from fifty percent.  Consistent with the fifty percent case selection hypothesis, 
plaintiffs and defendants who go to appeal win at rates that are statistically indistinguishable in 
almost three-quarters of state supreme courts. 
[Table 2 here] 
 While limited, there is some evidence of ideological bias in the states listed in Table 3.  
Fourteen states had win-rates that were statistically different from fifty percent and ten of these 
had LACs.  Of the fourteen, only three were biased in favor of the plaintiff while eleven tilted 
toward the defendants.  Two of the three courts favoring plaintiffs had a LAC.  Overall, the 
evidence concerning ideological bias in tort appeals in state supreme courts is sparse when 
viewed from the perspective of win-rates.  In sum, bias is the exception rather than the rule, it is 
predominantly conservative and it is most likely to occur in courts with discretionary dockets.  
Overall, tort outcomes in state supreme courts correspond remarkably well to the fifty percent 
hypothesis when viewed by area of law or even on a court-by-court basis. 
[Table 3 here] 
 
 The preliminary evidence would suggest that strategic litigants are acting in the manner 
hypothesized by the fifty percent rule.  We can look below the surface to see if in fact variations 
in win-rates are influenced by factors that could be reasoned to shape uncertainty.   While 
significant departures from fifty percent win-rates are the exception and not the norm, there is 
nonetheless variation in the degree of departure from this norm.   As we reason below, we expect 
to see smaller departures from the fifty percent norm when litigants have a stronger basis for 
estimating potential outcomes.  The magnitude of departure from fifty percent should increase as 
a function of uncertainty that litigants face if case selection is litigant driven as we hypothesize it 
is in states without LACs.  This expectation does not extend to outcomes in courts with LACs 
because case selection in those courts is a joint function of litigant and court strategies.  In these 
courts litigants need to pursue their appeal and the court has to grant review.    This process 
resembles that operating in the US Supreme Court. 
8 This distinction is not trivial.  The majority of literature concerning the effects of 
ideology on court outcomes centers on the United States Supreme Court while the preponderance 
of literature on the fifty percent rule focuses on trial courts.  As we reason below, conflicting 
hypotheses concerning the effects ideology has on outcomes in tort cases can be resolved by 
taking the appellate structure and the nature of the judicial vote into consideration. 
I. Uncertainty and the Fifty Percent Win-Rate Rule 
 
 The LE perspective posits that win-rates are driven by litigant strategies and that, other 
things being equal, plaintiffs and defendants should experience wins at fifty percent because the 
cases that actually reach the bench do not have obvious or simple solutions.  From this 
perspective, it is uncertainty about outcomes that leads cases to go to court.  Given this basic 
premise, we would expect that institutional and contextual variables that reduce uncertainty 
should also reduce departures from the fifty percent win-rate hypothesis in states without LACs. 
As noted above, our expectations about the effects of these influences are weaker when it comes 
to states with LACs. 
 Strategic litigants would be expected to try to estimate the preferences of courts.   
Uncertainty results from two sources.  First, features of courts may increase the accuracy of 
litigant estimates of court preferences.  Second, litigants may vary in their capability to make 
estimates of likely outcomes.  We consider each of these categories below. 
Features of Courts.  
What can reduce uncertainty for litigants about prospective outcomes? Judge seniority 
should provide information about judge preferences.  Judges with a longer history on the bench 
would have a track-record and litigants would have a stronger basis for estimating the likely 
outcome of an appeal so we would expect average judge seniority on a court to reduce deviations 
from the fifty percent win-rate. At the other extreme, if a court is primarily comprised of very 
junior or freshman jurists, then litigants have little basis for guessing how the court might decide 
9 their case. This, in turn, may cause errors in estimation and deviation from the fifty percent 
expectation. 
 Court size should operate in a similar manner. State supreme courts range in size from 
three to nine justices.  When courts are have more justices there is a larger amount of information 
about voting preferences of the judges and less turns on the proclivities of one or two justices. 
Furthermore, larger deliberative entities are generally regarded as providing more accurate, 
consistent, and reliable decisions (Abramowicz 2000; Surowieki 2004).   We would expect that 
larger courts provide better and more plentiful information for prospective appellants and as a 
consequence, there should be less deviation from the fifty percent win-rate hypothesis in states 
with larger state supreme courts. 
 Hanssen (1999) makes a compelling case for the effects of judicial elections on litigation.  
He reasons that elected judges are more predictatable than appointed judges.  Judicial 
appointment is intended to promote judicial independence and these judges should be less 
predictable (Landes and Posner 1975).  While Hanssen’s concern is with litigation rates (i.e., 
more cases go to trial when there is less certainty about judge preferences), the hypothesis should 
also extend to win-rates.  Specifically, we would expect smaller deviations from the fifty percent 
win-rate norm when there is more information about judge preferences and, following Hanssen’s 
logic, we hypothesize that elected justices are more predictable in their voting.   Deviations from 
the fifty percent win-rate should be smaller in states that elect their state supreme court justices.3 
 State supreme courts vary substantially in the resources they have to support their 
operations.  Court professionalization has been shown to influence court outcomes (Brace and 
Hall 2001; Hero 1998; Yates, Tankersley and Brace 2005).  More professionalized courts have 
                                                 
3 To operationalize states with elected methods of selection, we have separated those states with 
elective methods of re-selection from those states with appointive or retention election formats.  
Twenty states use either partisan or non-partisan elections to retain incumbent judges, while 
another thirty states use appointive methods of selection or non-competitive retention elections. 
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 more staff, higher operating budgets, and smaller dockets providing them with more time and 
resources for their deliberations.  Other things being equal, increased professionalization 
increases the likelihood that courts will produce more defensible and legally consistent decisions 
that are less likely to be subsequently overturned.  Courts with overcrowded dockets and very 
limited resources are more prone to error and are less predictable as a consequence.  We would 
expect higher levels of state supreme court professionalization to reduce litigant uncertainty about 
prospective outcomes and, as a result, we would anticipate deviations from fifty percent win-rates 
to be smaller in states with more professionalized state supreme courts. 
 In courts where judges serve longer terms, litigants have a stronger basis for estimating 
likely outcomes.  The more litigants can learn about judge preferences, the fewer miscalculations 
will be made about pursuing their appeal.  On courts where judges serve long terms, litigants and 
their counsel have a stronger basis for estimating prospective outcomes and cases with obvious 
solutions should be less likely to go to appeal.  We thus hypothesize that where courts have 
longer terms, deviations from the fifty percent rule should be smaller.4 
The LE approach reasons that while judges may vote ideologically, litigants would soon 
key in on these ideological proclivities and the effects of judge ideology on outcomes would be 
nullified.5   The reason for this is quite simple.  Litigants with cases with liberal dimensions 
would be unlikely to appeal an adverse trial outcome to a conservative court.  A plaintiff that lost 
                                                 
4 Length of judicial term varies substantially among the states from six years to fourteen years in 
forty-seven states.  Three states additionally – Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island 
– designate lifetime terms for state supreme court justices.  For both Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island, which do not restrict term, we have operationalized term length using an exogenous value, 
the average United States life expectancy (US Center for Disease Control 2003), and subtracted 
the age of entry from that value.  For New Hampshire which has mandatory retirement at the age 
of seventy, we have subtracted the age of entry from seventy.  While no single measure is 
completely satisfactory for lifetime tenure states, perceived duration of term is largely satisfied by 
this approach. 
5 We in fact tested judicial ideology (both in levels and change) in auxiliary models using both 
our main dependent variable (absolute deviations from fifty-percent) and an alternative dependent 
variable (deviations from fifty-percent, with lower values indicating defendant favoring 
deviations and higher values indicating plaintiff favoring deviations) and found that ideology did 
not have any statistically significant effect on either measure of deviation from the fifty percent 
win-rate expectation. 
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 a medical malpractice suit at trial should not be inclined to appeal that outcome to a higher court 
known to be conservative.  This selection process means that this conservative court seldom 
receives cases where they can exhibit their ideological preferences.  The same would be true for 
liberal state supreme courts.  A firm successfully sued at trial for negligence would be unlikely to 
appeal that outcome to a liberal state supreme court.  However, what if there was uncertainty 
about judge ideology?  We might expect new membership on a court to produce ideological 
change and this change could increase litigant uncertainty resulting in greater departures from the 
fifty percent norm. 
Litigant Capability  
Litigants commonly vary in terms of their capabilities (Galanter 1974) and this should be 
particularly true in tort cases where plaintiffs are typically inexperienced individual litigants who 
are taking a “single-shot,” pitted against defendant businesses who are often well seasoned 
“repeat players” in court.  Because they have more resources and experiences we would expect 
such defendants to make fewer errors in estimation concerning the outcome of an appeal.  
Plaintiffs, alternatively, should be more plagued by uncertainty because of their comparative 
disadvantage in resources and experience in court.  Because of this, we expect the departure from 
the fifty percent norm to increase as the proportion of plaintiff appeals increases in states 
without LACs.6  Misjudgments by plaintiffs are not expected to promote bias in outcomes in 
states with LACs because courts would typically be disinclined to hear cases they would affirm. 
 Our dependent variable for our first analysis is the degree of deviation in 
plaintiff/defendant win-rates from fifty percent (i.e. outcome bias).  The LE perspective posits a 
general equilibrium of fifty percent in these win-rates conditioned by the factors influencing 
litigant uncertainty.  We further posit that these forces should operate when the case selection 
                                                 
6 We would also expect the direction of this bias to be in favor of defendants if in fact plaintiffs 
were inclined to misestimate their chances in court.  In auxiliary analyses we in fact find 
significant bias in favor of the defendant in plaintiff initiated appeals, suggesting a higher level of 
strategic miscalculation by plaintiffs. 
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 process is driven by litigant strategies but not where judges have discretion over which cases 
they hear.  We thus divide our analysis of the effects of uncertainty on outcome bias into states 
with and without LACs. 
II. Ideology, Appellate Structure and Strategic Reversals 
 
 In our second analysis we consider the conditions under which state supreme court 
justices’ voting can be explained by the ideological voting hypothesized in the IV literature. Our 
dependent variable for this analysis is simply the proportion of liberal voting outcomes (i.e., 
justices’ votes for plaintiffs) per annum in tort cases in state supreme courts (liberal vote 
proportion).  As noted above, McGuire, Smith and Caldeira (2004) (see also McGuire and 
Stimson 2004) make a convincing case that the effects of ideology on outcomes should be 
conditioned by nature of the case.  Appellants may make accurate and inaccurate estimates of the 
preferences of judges and courts may choose to review cases or not.  Affirmances of lower courts 
occur when a petitioner misestimates the appellate court’s ideology.  They are no better off than 
they were before they brought the appeal and have had to bear additional costs of litigation.  
These cases represent strategic miscalculations and are not expected to provide evidence of 
ideological voting.  Alternatively, reversals occur when a petitioner accurately estimates that the 
outcome of their case in a lower court would be overturned in the higher court.  Because the 
appellate process operates primarily to correct error, these strategic reversals cases are expected 
to be more frequent; given discretionary jurisdiction, courts would generally let lower court 
decisions they favor stand and intervene to reverse lower court decisions they oppose.   
When courts have discretion over their dockets they should select cases for review with 
lower court outcomes that are inconsistent with their preferences.  A conservative court should 
reverse liberal lower court outcomes and liberal courts should reverse conservative lower court 
outcomes.  It is in these cases where the effects of justice ideology should be evident (McGuire, 
Smith and Caldeira, 2004; McGuire and Stimson 2004).  From this perspective the influence of 
judge ideology on judicial outcomes is contingent on court discretion and the type of case being 
13
 heard.   Following this reasoning, we expect the effects of judge ideology to surface in states 
with LACs in reversals.  We do not expect ideology to have an impact in courts with non-
discretionary dockets, or in affirmances. 
Ultimately, we thus posit that the effects of court ideology on outcomes in tort cases (at 
least) in state supreme courts are contingent upon the fundamental structure of the court system.  
The implication is that the effect of judge ideology on outcomes is, at root, a matter of 
institutional design.  When judges have discretion to select cases, ideology matters.  When they 
do not have this discretion, litigant strategies and the effects of uncertainty cancel out the 
influence of judge ideology on outcomes in tort appeals.  The variables discussed above for both 
of our analyses are defined and described in Table 4. 
Results 
 
I. Uncertainty and Deviations from the Fifty Percent Win-Rate  
 We begin with our findings for absolute deviations from the fifty percent hypothesis. Our 
dependant variable is, again, the percentage of wins by the plaintiff minus fifty percent, expressed 
as an absolute value.7 Our interest is with influences that may operate to promote or retard 
departures from the expected equilibrium of fifty percent.  We compare the effects of these 
variables for all states and then contrast their effects for states with and without LACs.  Our 
expectation is these variables will function most effectively when the appellate process is litigant 
driven (i.e., when there is no LAC) and less effectively when judges can act strategically in 
selecting cases for review as is the case when there are LACs.8 
                                                 
7 As previously discussed in footnote five, in an auxiliary analysis we found directional biases 
favoring one party or the other, depending on context. For this dependent variable, we consider 
the absolute deviation of differences from fifty percent because we are interested in discerning the 
generalizable factors that lead to litigant error in either direction. 
8 Our unit of analysis is the state-year and our variables represent state-year averages of aspects 
of all tort cases filed in state supreme courts. Variation among the quantity of tort appeals before 
the state supreme courts (used to compute such averages) may affect the overall model; therefore, 
weights related to the quantity of tort appeals are incorporated to account for such 
differences. We use analytical weights (aweights in STATA) to address this variance in the 
number of  tort appeals in state supreme courts.  In STATA, aweights, or analytic weights, are 
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 The Overall model presented in column one of Table 5 explains approximately 27 
percent of the variance and performs reasonably well.  In this model the correctly signed and 
statistically significant coefficients for size of court, justice term length, and elected method of 
selection provide support for our hypotheses.  These results conform to our expectations:  when 
there are more judges, there are longer terms, and when you elect judges, litigants face less 
uncertainty and win-rates stay closer to fifty percent, other things being equal. 
[Insert Table 5] 
  When we consider the results for states with LACs in column two no single variable 
emerges as a significant influence on deviations from the fifty percent norm.  This stands in 
striking contrast to the results for states without LACs in column three.  As hypothesized, court 
size, elected method of selection, and longer judicial terms receive directional support and are 
statistically significant.  Substantively, larger state supreme courts decrease deviation from fifty 
percent support for the plaintiff by approximately 4.5 percent per additional justice.  Elected 
courts reduce departure from fifty percent by over 11 percent and a standard deviation increase in  
justices’ term lengths (3.47 years) is associated with an almost 3 percent decrease in deviation.  In 
addition, plaintiffs’ appeals are strongly and significantly associated with deviations from the 
fifty percent norm.  For every ten percent increase in the number of plaintiff appeals, there is a 
3.8 percent departure from the fifty percent norm.  Since plaintiffs are commonly “single-shot” 
individuals going up against “repeat player” organizations, this finding is consistent with 
capability theories of litigation.   Plaintiffs appear less capable of estimating outcomes. 
 It is notable that ideology exerts no statistically discernable effects on win-rates within 
either appellate structure.  In addition to the ideological change measure reported above, in 
auxiliary analyses we also considered the effects of basic ideology, and the effects of both 
                                                                                                                                                 
weights that are inversely proportional to the variance of an observation; i.e., the variance of the 
j-th observation is assumed to be sigma2/w_j, where w_j are the weights.  Thus, the observations 
represent averages and the weights are the number of elements that gave rise to the average. See 
http://www.stata.com/help.cgi?weights  .  Analytical weights allow modification 
to the ordinary least squares procedure where heteroskedastic error may exist (Kennedy 1998). 
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 measures of ideology, on percentage of plaintiff victories.  We found no significant effects for 
either measure of ideology on either absolute bias or direction of bias.  The uniform null result 
concerning ideology would conform to the LE thesis that case selection processes cancels out the 
effects of judge ideology.   
 What ultimately emerges from the comparison of findings between the two appellate 
systems illustrates the effect of LACs, court discretion, and litigant strategies on case selection 
and outcomes.  When there are LACs the variables we hypothesize to influence litigant 
uncertainty exert no influence on deviations from the fifty percent win-rate.   Presumably litigant 
strategies are being confounded by court strategies when they can exercise discretion to hear 
cases.  Alternatively, where there are no LACs, deviations from the fifty percent norm are 
significantly smaller where courts are larger, where judges are elected, and where judge terms are 
longer.  On these courts, deviations from the fifty percent norm are significantly higher where 
there are higher proportions of plaintiff appeals, indicating that litigant ability to estimate 
uncertainty also plays a role.   In combination, institutional features and litigant capabilities, 
conditioned by the appellate structure, significantly influence departures from the fifty percent 
norm anticipated by the LE perspective. 
II.  Ideology, Appellate Structure and Strategic Reversals 
 
 In this analysis we consider the effects of ideology on outcomes, taking into 
consideration the nature of the case (affirmances versus reversals) and the nature of the appellate 
court structure with the expectation that the effects of ideology will be evident only in reversals in 
states with LACs.   
 Table 6 presents the analysis of proportion of judge votes favoring plaintiffs, which we 
contend is a reflection of liberal outcomes.  We would expect liberal judges to support plaintiffs 
more than conservative judges. We have divided our analysis into votes in reversals where theory 
would lead us to expect ideological voting, and affirmances, where the same theory would predict 
no ideology effects.  Following past practice, we also divide our analysis into states with and 
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 without the discretionary docket control afforded by the presence of a LAC.  We anticipate that 
judicial discretion in case selection is a necessary condition for ideological influence on 
outcomes. 
 The results in Table 6 conform exactly to the expectations offered by McGuire, et al., and 
the supplemental caveat we offer here.  Specifically, ideological voting in these tort cases is 
evident in reversals but not in affirmances just as McGuire, et al., posit.  However, this 
relationship emerges only in judicial structures where the courts have discretionary dockets, much 
like the US Supreme court.  In these instances, we surmise, courts can issue strategic reversals 
that fit their ideological preferences.  Alternatively, the effects of ideology are not evident in 
states without LACs in either reversals or affirmances.  We surmise this is because in these states 
the case selection process is driven exclusively by litigant case selection processes that operate to 
cancel out the influence of judge ideology.  We also do not find significant ideological effects in 
affirmances more generally.  Like McGuire et al., we surmise these cases are the result of 
miscalculations on the part of the petitioner which nullifies the effects of judge ideology. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The findings presented above shed light on the foundations of the empirical support for 
two major theoretical approaches to the understanding of judicial processes and should help 
researchers understand the role institutional structure plays in shaping the judicial process and 
judicial outcomes.  Our results provide support for both the LE and the IV perspectives but reveal 
several important conditions that allow each explanation to function.  Specifically, the LE 
hypotheses of the fifty percent win-rate operates where case selection is litigant-driven and 
departures from it are shaped by institutional factors that influence levels of uncertainty for 
litigants, and the ability of litigants to deal with uncertainty.  This model does not function well 
where case selection is shaped by judicial discretion.  While litigants no doubt remain strategic in 
these situations, it is the court that ultimately shapes the docket in LAC states and variables 
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 reasoned to influence litigant strategies were not significant in these states.   
 When it comes to the effects of judge ideology, the opposite is true.  As predicted by the 
LE approach, judge ideology does not exert an influence on outcomes when case selection is 
litigant-driven.  Presumably litigants take the ideological preferences of courts into consideration 
when they decide to take their case to court (or not).  Consistent with IV approaches, we find that 
ideology emerges as appropriately signed and statistically significant in cases involving reversals.  
This effect, however, is limited to courts afforded discretionary control of their dockets by the 
presence of LACs (much like the US Supreme Court). 
We believe these findings have far-reaching implications for broad understandings of the 
judicial process.  In our judicial system there are two fundamental processes operating.  One is 
litigant-driven, occurring primarily at the trial level but also in appellate courts without 
discretionary jurisdiction.  The rule of law from these litigated cases results from a case selection 
process that tends to weed out cases with more obvious or ideological solutions.  The other 
system is driven by the complex interplay of litigant strategies and judge/court discretion. 
Litigants unsatisfied with lower court rulings may strategize that a higher court will sympathize 
with their plight but whether their case is heard or not is in the hands of the court.  Consistent 
with McGuire et al., specifically, and the IV literature more generally, a system of ideological 
judge voting is evident.  Courts strategically reverse lower court rulings when they have 
discretionary control of their docket. 
 Judicial outcomes are a product of litigant strategies and judge preferences mediated by 
institutional structures.  We have identified the conditions where litigant strategies play a sizable 
role, and where judge ideology exerts a significant influence.  Comprehensive theories of judicial 
decision-making must consider both the processes that do and do not shape court dockets, and the 
conditions under which judges may register their preferences.  When courts do not have docket 
control, litigant strategies operate to cancel out judge ideological effects.  When courts can pick 
their cases they may strategically reverse lower court decisions and exhibit their ideological 
18
 preferences.  Judge ideology is not universally important or unimportant but conditional on the 
structure of the court and the nature of the case.   
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 Table 1 
Plaintiff Success Rates by Areas of Tort Litigation  
within States without Lower Appellate Courts 
 
State State Has No Lower Appellate Court (N) 
State Has Lower 
Appellate Court (N) 
Automobile 48.89% (194) 53.08% (471) 
Discrimination 45.12% (46) 44.11% (139) 
Libel 45.00% (52) 45.04% (115) 
Medical Malpractice 53.29% (105) 44.67% (386) 
Labor - Miscellaneous 44.70% (23) 61.17% (82) 
Premises Liability - Government 46.40% (51) 46.81% (155) 
Premises Liability - Private 50.30% (123) 53.14% (343) 
Product Liability 43.78% (74) 52.01% (293) 
Professional Malpractice 41.79% (89) 45.78% (290) 
Toxic 28.79% (17) 44.57% (62) 
Workers' Injury - Government 53.93% (175) 46.46% (322) 
Workers' Injury - Private 47.84% (285) 51.35% (688) 
 
Note:  Entries in bold are statistically different from 50 percent at the .05 level 
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 Table 2 
Plaintiff Win-Rates 
Not Significantly Different from Fifty Percent 
 
State Plaintiff Win-Rates (N) 
Lower 
Appellate 
Court 
Alaska 42.28% (149) N 
California 45.21% (73) Y 
Colorado 51.89% (106) Y 
Connecticut 45.28% (106) Y 
Delaware 56.36% (55) N 
Florida 52.00% (75) Y 
Georgia 56.92% (65) Y 
Hawaii 49.25% (67) Y 
Indiana 63.46% (52) Y 
Kansas 46.07% (89) Y 
Kentucky 53.33% (90) Y 
Louisiana 46.83% (126) Y 
Maine 42.42% (165) N 
Maryland 50.00% (86) Y 
Michigan 52.13% (94) Y 
Mississippi 45.30% (181) Y 
Missouri 53.73% (67) Y 
Montana 52.91% (206) N 
Nebraska 50.43% (234) Y 
New Hampshire 54.81% (104) N 
New Jersey 56.38% (94) Y 
New Mexico 61.82% (55) Y 
New York 45.37% (108) Y 
North Carolina 51.79% (56) Y 
North Dakota 42.67% (150) N 
Ohio 50.00% (188) Y 
Oklahoma 53.62% (138) Y 
Pennsylvania 50.39% (127) Y 
Rhode Island 46.91% (162) N 
South Carolina 47.11% (154) Y 
Tennessee 56.30% (119) Y 
Utah 47.12% (104) Y 
Virginia 55.63% (151) Y 
Washington 48.39% (93) Y 
West Virginia 51.16% (172) N 
Wisconsin 40.28% (72) Y 
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 Table 3 
Plaintiff Win-Rates Statistically Different From Fifty Percent (.05 level) 
 
State Plaintiff Win-Rates (N) 
Lower 
Appellate 
Court 
Favored Defendant   
Alabama 44.01% (309) Y 
Arkansas 37.11% (159) Y 
Idaho 39.04% (146) Y 
Illinois 39.29% (112) Y 
Iowa 30.73% (179) Y 
Massachusetts 31.68% (101) Y 
Minnesota 40.00% (110) Y 
South Dakota 35.71% (154) N 
Texas 29.68% (219) Y 
Vermont 33.75% (80) N 
Wyoming 24.34% (152) N 
   
Favored Plaintiff   
Arizona 80.95% (42) Y 
Nevada 60.00% (110) N 
Oregon 65.31% (49) Y 
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 Table 4 
Variable Descriptions for Models of Vote Instability and the  
Proportion of Liberal Votes 
 
Dependent Variables  Value Description Mean Std.Dev. Min/Max 
Outcome Bias = absolute value (observed plaintiff win-rate – 50 %) 10.44 8.15 0/39.66 
Liberal Vote Proportion = proportion of justice votes in favor of plaintiff .48 .12 .13/.89 
    
Independent Variables  Value Description Mean Std.Dev. Min/Max 
Court Ideology = measure of state supreme court liberalism, ranging conservative to liberal 
(Brace, Langer and Hall 2000) 39.31 16.14 5.52/81.39 
Elect = 1 if state supreme court justices are elected 
0 otherwise .42 .49 0/1 
Ideological Change = absolute value (observed court ideology – previous year’s court ideology) 2.22 3.12 0/20.73 
Plaintiff Appeals = percentage of cases that are plaintiff initiated appeals 65.47 16.98 12.50/100 
Professionalization = factor score of staff, salary, docket, and justices per capita, ranging non-
professionalized to highly professionalized (Brace and Hall 2001) .001 .96 -1.25/4.83 
Seniority = average years of justice service by state supreme court 8.47 2.96 2.88/18.9 
Size = number of justices on state supreme court 6.44 1.27 5/9 
Term = length of the term (in years) for state supreme court justices 9.08 3.47 6/20 
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Table 5 
Win-Rates in Tort Cases 
Predicting Deviations from Fifty Percent Plaintiff/ Defendant 
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) 
Dependent Variable:  Abs. Val[Obs. Plaintiff Win-rate – 50 percent] 
 Overall  States with Lower Appellate Courts  States without Lower Appellate Courts 
 Coef. s.e. t  Coef. s.e. t  Coef. s.e. t 
Seniority 0.3449 0.2891 1.19  0.2635 0.3836 0.69  -0.3910 0.6694 -0.58 
Size -0.7736 0.3625 -2.13  -0.2265 0.4352 -0.52  -4.6834 1.4855 -3.15 
Elect -2.2138 0.7066 -3.13  0.4268 1.6392 0.26  -11.1271 1.1585 -9.60 
Professionalization -0.4397 0.3426 -1.28  -0.0265 0.1627 -0.16  0.8922 2.3610 0.38 
Term -0.2247 0.1240 -1.81  0.1637 0.1095 1.49  -0.8496 0.2738 -3.10 
Plaintiff Suit -0.0014 0.0411 -0.04  -0.0495 0.0543 -0.91  0.3842 0.1485 2.59 
Ideological Change -0.1346 0.1954 -0.69  0.0486 0.2626 0.19  -0.3473 0.3614 -0.96 
Constant 0.3449 0.2891 2.43  9.3255 4.9821 1.87  26.7624 10.4032 2.57 
            
N 141    108    33   
R2 .27    .32    .50   
Rho .15    .19    -.02   
            
Entries in bold are significant at the .05 level. (Year dummy variables included in the model are not displayed). 
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 Table 6 
Predicting the Liberal Proportion of State Supreme Courts Votes in Tort Cases 
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) 
Dependent Variable:  Proportion of Votes Favoring Plaintiff 
 
 States with and without Lower Appellate Courts 
 Combined  Reversal  Affirm  
 Coef. s.e. t  Coef. s.e. T  Coef. s.e. t  
Court Ideology 0.0005 0.0006 0.93  0.0023 0.0007 3.42  -0.0001 0.0009 -0.10  
Constant 0.4399 0.0220 19.96  0.5454 0.0258 21.11  0.2861 0.0328 8.73  
N 200    200    200    
R2 .81    .81    .55    
rho .25    .28    .35    
             
 States with Lower Appellate Courts 
 Coef. s.e. t  Coef. s.e. T  Coef. s.e. t  
Court Ideology 0.0015 0.0005 2.88  0.0029 0.0008 3.71  0.0013 0.0009 1.44  
Constant 0.4034 0.0193 20.93  0.5040 0.0291 17.33  0.2497 0.0335 7.46  
N 156    156    156    
R2 .85    .80    .62    
rho .23    .27    .27    
             
 States without Lower Appellate Courts 
 Coef. s.e. t  Coef. s.e. T  Coef. s.e. t  
Court Ideology -0.0008 0.0009 -0.92  0.0011 0.0007 1.56  -0.0022 0.0014 -1.51  
Constant 0.4911 0.0336 14.62  0.6509 0.0254 25.61  0.3157 0.0552 5.72  
N 44    44    44    
R2 .63    .81    .45    
rho .21    .31    .40    
 
Entries in bold are significant at the .05 level. (Year dummy variables included in the model are not displayed). 
 
 
